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Abstract  
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has finally forced corporations to examine the validity of their 
spreadsheets. They are beginning to understand the spreadsheet error literature, including what it 
tells them about the need for comprehensive spreadsheet testing. However, controlling for fraud 
will require a completely new set of capabilities, and a great deal of new research will be needed 
to develop fraud control capabilities. This paper discusses the riskiness of spreadsheets, which 
can now be quantified to a considerable degree. It then discusses how to use control frameworks 
to reduce the dangers created by spreadsheets. It focuses especially on testing, which appears to 
be the most crucial element in spreadsheet controls. 
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Figures 
 
Figures are printed at the end of the paper. 
 
Introduction 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
In 2002, after financial reporting frauds at Enron and other major companies, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This act covers many things, including the retention of 
documents. However, the focus of the Act, which is often called SOX, is Section 404. This 
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section requires chief corporate officers to assess whether their financial reporting systems are 
effective. Furthermore, it assumes an independent external auditor must assess the officers' 
assessment. 
 
To implement SOX, Congress created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) to create auditing standards. PCAOB's main guidance on 404 assessments of control 
attestations has been Auditing Standard No. 2, An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial 
Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements. 
 
The focus of SOX and of Auditing Standard 2 is the creation of effective controls. Figure 1 
illustrates that controls are ways to help a corporation achieve its goals, such as producing 
accurate financial reports. Controls cannot guarantee that the goals will be met, but they reduce 
the risk that these goals will not be met. In this context, effectively controlled financial reporting 
processes give reasonable assurance that the company will meet the goal of producing accurate 
financial reports. 
 
Effectively controlled financial reporting processes give reasonable assurance that 
the company will meet the goal of producing accurate financial reports. 
 
Figure 1: Controls 
 
According to Standard 2, an internal control deficiency exists when the design or operation 
of a control does not allow for the timely prevention or detection of misstatements. The standard 
defines two types of deficiencies: 
 
• In a significant deficiency, there is more than a remote likelihood that the financial 
statements will be impacted in a manner that is consequential but not material. 
 
• In a material deficiency, there is "a significant deficiency, or combination of significant 
deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of 
the annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected." Vorhies 
[2005] indicates that a 5% error in revenues is the usual threshold for labeling a deficiency 
as material because a smaller difference is not likely to sway a reasonable investor. 
 
This distinction between significant and material internal control deficiencies is important 
because if management finds even a single material deficiency, it is not allowed to assess its 
internal controls as effective. 
 
The Use of Spreadsheets in Financial Reporting 
 
Auditing Standard No. 2 clarifies that controls must involve all forms of information 
technology (IT) used in financial reporting. One particular IT concern for corporations is 
the use of spreadsheets in financial reporting. There have long been indications that many 
spreadsheets are large [Cale, 1994; Cragg & King, 1993; Floyd, Walls, & Marr, 1995; Hall, 
1996], complex [Hall, 1996], and very important to their firm [Chan & Storey, 1996; 
Gable, Yap & Eng, 1991; Hall, 1996;]. When Comshare, Inc. surveyed 700 finance and 
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budgeting professionals in the mid- I 990s, it found that spreadsheets were already 
dominating budgeting [Modem Office Technology, 1994]. In turn, when CPS [2001] did a 
survey of strategic planning practices in major U.S. corporation, 72% of respondents relied 
on spreadsheets exclusively to do strategic planning. 
 
Although some people may doubt that companies use spreadsheets in critical 
financial reporting operations, the widespread use of spreadsheets is well documented. 
 
• Financial intelligence firm CODA reports that 95% of U.S. firms use spreadsheets for 
financial reporting according to its experience (www.coda.com). 
 
• In 2004, RevenueRecognition.com [2004] (now Softtrax) had the International Data 
Corporation interview 118 business leaders. IDC found that 8 5% were using 
spreadsheets in financial reporting and forecasting. 
 
• CFO.com [Durfee 2004] interviewed 168 finance executives in 2004. The interviews 
asked about infori-nation technology use in the finance department. Out of 14 
technologies discussed, only two were widely used-spreadsheets and basic budgeting 
and planning systems. Every subject said that his or her department used 
spreadsheets. 
 
• In 2003, the Hacket Group (www.thehacketgroup.com) surveyed mid-size 
companies. It found that 47% of companies use stand-alone spreadsheets for planning 
and budgeting. 
 
• In Europe, A.R.C. Morgan interviewed 376 individuals responsible for overseeing 
SOX compliance in multinationals that do business in the United States 
[TMCnet.com, 2004]. These respondents came from 21 different countries. More 
than 80% of the respondents said that their firms use spreadsheets for both managing 
the control environment and financial reporting. 
 
• In a webcast for Deloitte on May 22, 2005, the first author was able to ask a series of 
questions of the audience. The average response size was just over 800 financial 
professionals and officers in corporations. One question specifically asked, "Does 
your firm use spreadsheets of material importance in financial reporting?" Of the 
respondents, 87.7% answered in affirmative., while 7.1% said, "No." (Another 5.2% 
chose "Not Applicable.") 
 
Furthermore, when companies use spreadsheets for financial reporting, they often use 
many. One firm used more than 200 spreadsheets in its financial planning process. 
 
Today, companies are widely confused over what to do about spreadsheet errors. 
Obviously, if financial reporting spreadsheets contain a significant number of errors and a 
reasonable amount of testing has not been done, it is difficult to say that the reporting process is 
well controlled. 
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Most firms will have to implement Section 404 for their Year-End 2005 financial reports. 
Most firms and external auditing companies are likely to issue vague statements about their 
spreadsheet controls or are likely to ignore spreadsheets entirely. However, as we will see below, 
these assessments are likely to be wrong.  
 
Lack of Controls 
 
One concern with spreadsheets is that they are rarely well controlled [Davies & Ikin, 1987; 
Cragg & King, 1993; Fernandez, 2002; Floyd, Walls, & Marr, 1995; Gosling, 2003; Hall, 1996; 
Hendry & Green, 1994; Nardi & Miller, 1991; Nardi, 1993; Schultheis & Sumner, 1994). This is 
not surprising because few organizations have serious control policies-or indeed any policies at 
all-for spreadsheet development [Cale, 1994; Fernandez, 2002; Floyd, Walls, & Marr, 1995; 
Galletta & Hufnagel, 1992; Hall, 1996; Speier & Brown, 1996]. 
 
A specific concern is testing. Although there has long been evidence that spreadsheet error, 
at least, is widespread, organizations rarely mandate that spreadsheets and other end user 
applications be tested after development [Cale, 1994; Cragg & King, 1993; Floyd, Walls, & 
Marr, 1995; Galletta & Hufnagel, 1992; Gosling, 2003; Hall, 1996; Speier & Brown, 1996]. 
Also, individual developers rarely engage in systematic testing on their own spreadsheets after 
development [Cragg & King, 1993; Davies & Ikin, 1987; Hall, 1996; Schultheis & Sumner, 
1994]. 
 
As noted earlier, the first author was able to ask questions of corporate financial 
professionals and officers in a webcast. Figure 2 shows respondent answers when they were 
asked, "For spreadsheets of material importance used in financial reporting, what percentage does 
your company test?" By and large, this figure shows that few spreadsheets are tested, even if they 
are of material importance. However, it shows that 17% of the respondents said that their firm 
tests more than 25% of their material financial spreadsheets, and 16% said that their firm tests 
nearly all. This makes it appear that a sizeable minority of companies do test their spreadsheets. 
However, as we will see later, what most respondents call testing is "looking over the 
spreadsheet," not comprehensive cell-by-cell testing. 
 
Figure 2: Testing for Material Financial Spreadsheets 
 
This lack of comprehensive testing may exist because developers tend to be overconfident 
of the accuracy of their untested spreadsheets. Certainly, widespread overconfidence, often in the 
face of widespread errors, has been seen repeatedly in spreadsheet research [Brown & Gould, 
1987; Davies & lkin, 1987; Floyd, Walls, & Marr, 1995; Panko & Halverson, 1997; Panko & 
Featherman, 2005]. 
In a vicious cycle, organizations that do not test their spreadsheets get no feedback on real 
error rates and so do not realize the ubiquity of spreadsheet errors, and, therefore, see no need for 
testing. Rasmussen [ 1974] has noted that people use stopping rules to decide when to stop doing 
activities such as testing. If people are overconfident they are likely to stop too early. 
Consequently, if firms use spreadsheets to make decisions but do not test their spreadsheets, they 
may not realize how many errors there are in their spreadsheets. 
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One might argue that the real world would provide painful feedback if a spreadsheet were 
incorrect. For some situations, such as budgeting, errors would have to be small in order to pass 
undetected. Unfortunately, in this case, even small percentage errors can be very damaging. 
Hicks [ 1995] found that a relatively small percentage error in the capital budgeting spreadsheet 
he examined would have produced an error of several hundred million dollars. At the other 
extreme, when a new situation is modeled, such as the purchase of another company, even large 
errors in the spreadsheet might not be obvious. If a promising corporate purchase goes bad, 
furthermore, it would be easy to dismiss the problem as being due to unforeseen factors even if 
the real problem is a spreadsheet error. Without testing, real-world feedback may not be very 
effective. 
 
Overall, spreadsheet errors are widespread and there are strong prospects for fraud This 
situation is at odds with the looseness with which most organizations treat their spreadsheets. 
 
The Prevalence of Spreadsheet Errors 
 
One problem with spreadsheets is the specter of errors. If even a single spreadsheet has 
more than a remote likelihood of creating a material financial error through having errors, the 
organization will not be able to assess its entire financial reporting system as effective. In 
addition, if a company uses a large number of spreadsheets in financial reporting-as most firms 
do-then a collection of spreadsheets that individually only have significant potential deficiencies 
because of errors may constitute a material internal control deficiency. 
Are errors common in spreadsheets? The answer is that errors are extremely common. The 
most convincing data on this come from audits of real-world operational spreadsheets. Figure 3, 
which presents data from several audit studies, shows convincingly that spreadsheet errors are 
anything but rare. 
 
Figure 3: Audits of Real-World Spreadsheets 
 
• First, these audits found errors in nearly all (94%) of the spreadsheets they audited. This 
percentage would have been even higher, but several of the studies only reported serious 
errors. In other words, we can expect nearly all spreadsheets to contain errors. 
 
• Second, these audits found many errors in the spreadsheets they audited. 
 
• Specifically, studies that measured errors on a per-formula basis [Butler, 2000; Clermont, 
Hanin, & Mittermeier, 2002; Hicks. 1995- Lawrence & Lee, 2004; Lukasic, 1998] found 
errors in 5.2% of the formulas in these spreadsheets. Most large spreadsheets have 
thousands of formula cells, so most large spreadsheets probably have dozens or even 
hundreds of errors. 
 
If this cell error rate seems excessive, it should not. There has been a great deal of research on 
human error [Panko, 2005a], and for tasks of comparable complexity, such as writing computer 
program statements, similar error rates are also seen. Panko (2005a) has summarized results from 
a number of studies that measured fault rates in real-world software. Of particular value are four 
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large studies [Madachy, 1996; O'Neill, 1994; Ebenau & Strauss, 1994; Weller 19931. In these 
studies, average fault rates ranged from 1.5% to 2.6%. Note that this is very close to the cell error 
rates seen in Figure 3 for spreadsheet code inspection. Zage and Zage [1993] and Grady [1992] 
both found that fault rates depend on program difficulty. In both studies, fault rates were at least 
twice as high for difficult programs as for simple programs. 
 
Humans appear to have an error rate floor that exists despite working very carefully. Everyone 
has a similar error rate floor, and working more carefully can decrease this error rate only 
modestly. Research has shown that the same human cognitive processes that allow us to respond 
to the world correctly most of the time have unavoidable trade-offs that create errors a few 
percent of the time [Reason, 19901. In most human cognitive activities, such small error rates are 
only minor nuisances, if anyone notices them at all. However, when dozens of formula cells are 
on a chain to calculate a bottom-line financial value, the probability of error in the bottom-line 
value becomes unacceptable, 
 
 How many spreadsheet errors are significant or material? (As noted earlier, a 5% error in 
an important bottom-line value in a key financial variable would probably be considered a 
material error [Vorhies, 2005].) Unfortunately, we lack hard data on this critical issue. However, 
when Panko [2005b] interviewed the two spreadsheet auditing principals, both independently 
gave data suggesting that about 5% of all spreadsheets contain what one of the interviewees 
called "show stopper" errors. In addition, the Coopers and Lybrand [ 1997] study shown in 
Figure 3 did not report an error unless there was at least a 5 % error in a bottom line value. The 
study found such errors in 9 1 % of all spreadsheets. KPMG found a similar error rate and only 
reported spreadsheets to be incorrect if they contained errors that would make a difference to 
decision makers. 
 
 We also have data from software inspections, which sometimes classify errors as major or 
minor. Although definitions about what constitutes a major error differ, all software audit studies 
that have used the major/minor distinction found that major errors are very common. Bush [ 
1994] and Jones [ 1996] both reported that a quarter of the errors in the inspections they 
examined were major errors. O'Neill [1994] found only 13% of errors to be major, while 
Schulmeyer [ 1999] found that 42% of all errors were ma or. In addition, Ebenau and Strauss [ 
1994] and Weller [ 1993 ] found maj or errors in 1.4% to 2.8% of the lines of code examined but 
did not report major errors as a percentage of total errors. Given this data from software 
inspections, it certainly would be risky to assume that nearly all spreadsheet errors will be minor. 
  
The Prospect of Spreadsheet Fraud 
 
 Although there has been a great deal of research on spreadsheet error, there has not been 
formal research on spreadsheet fraud. Legally, a fraud exists when one person knowingly lies or 
conceals information whose nondisclosure would make other statements misleading, in order to 
get the victim to act in a way contrary to the victim's interests, Note that two elements are needed 
for there to be fraud: deception and harm, 
 
 There has long been concern that spreadsheet developers will use optimistic (or 
pessimistic) assumptions to make their plans and actions look better [Levy, 1984]. However, few 
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people would consider this "puffery" to be fraud because people who read spreadsheets should be 
somewhat skeptical consumers of spreadsheet results. However, if people to whom spreadsheets 
results are submitted are not likely to be aware of the degree of risk, this is at least an ethical 
violation [Newell, 1995]. In addition, when the damage due to deception increases in intensity, 
then spreadsheet misanalysis rises to the level of fraud. 
 
H. M. Customs and Excise  
 
Spreadsheet fraud is not just a theoretical concern. In England, the H. M. Customs and 
Excise collects certain types of taxes. When spreadsheets became prevalent in tax submissions, 
the agency began to audit submitted spreadsheets and found that many had substantial errors. In 
the late 1990s, the agency developed a program to automate many aspects of this auditing 
process [Butler, 2000]. This was SpACE (Spreadsheet Auditing by Customs & Excise). In 
addition to looking for innocent errors, the program also looked for certain types of fraud that the 
agency had found in earlier audits. For instance, the program looks for a number that was entered 
as text. Excel treats text cells as having the value zero. Consequently, entering a number in a 
column of numbers as text reduces the real total. This will create a fraudulent reduction in tax 
payments. 
 
The All First Fraud Scandal 
 
 The most famous case of spreadsheet fraud occurred at Allfirst, which was a U.S. 
subsidiary of Allied Irish Banks (AIB) in Ireland. The best information about this case comes 
from the United States Department of Justice (2002). 
 
A currency trader, John Rusnak, began losing money in his trades around 1997. He used a 
series of spreadsheet subterfuges to hide his losses, which continued to increase, When the fraud 
was finally discovered, his losses amounted to $691.2 million USD. Although neither Allfirst nor 
Allied Irish Bank went into receivership, the losses amounted to 60% of AIB's 2001 revenues, 
and losses produced major drops in stock prices. After the scandal, AIB sold off its Allfirst 
subsidiary. 
 
 AIB immediately commissioned Eugene Ludwig, former U.S. Comptroller of the 
Currency, to prepare a report on the incident. The story his report tells is an excellent cautionary 
tale.  
 
Rusnak began by entering two false option trades in the company's trading system-receipt 
of a large premium and the payment of a large premium. The first option would expire the day of 
the trade, the other one later. Allfirst had no reports on options that expired the same day and so 
did not detect what Rusnak was doing. The second option created a false asset on the company's 
books. This offset the real losing position that Rusnak wished to hide. 
 
 Initially, Rusnak used fake broker confirmations to validate his fictitious deals. This was 
risky because the back office staff reconciled trades with receipts. However, Rusnak convinced 
back-office personnel that they did not have to confirm the trades because they were offsetting 
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deals with no transfer of cash. 
 
 In 2001, the head of treasury funds at Allfirst noted that Rusnak's trades were using up an 
unusually large portion of his balance sheet and that this was disproportionate to his earnings. He 
ordered Rusnak to reduce his exposure on the balance sheet. Rusnak did so, but he accomplished 
this using highly risk trades that saddled the company with massive potential liabilities. 
 
 One control at Allfirst was to compute a value-at-risk (VaR) ratio for each trader. The 
data for these calculations were supposed to have been computed independent by the back office 
staff, but Rusnak was able to persuade them to use data on his computer. He manipulated this 
data to make his VaR ratio look acceptable. 
 
 The fraud came apart when a back office supervisor noticed that Rusnak's trades were not 
being confirmed as required by procedures. The supervisor discovered that a number of trades 
were clearly bogus. He notified management of the problem. The fraud quickly unraveled. 
 
 Rusnak eventually entered into a plea agreement that got him only seven years in jail. 
This relatively "light" sentence was a result of his agreeing to work with prosecutors in 
prosecuting people in other companies whose actions prolonged the time it took for Rusnak's 
scheme to unravel [BBC, 2002]. 
 
Legislation: SOX and Beyond 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and Financial Fraud 
 
 We have seen that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, also known as SOX, requires U.S. 
firms and the many foreign firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges to have effective controls for 
their financial reporting systems and to report on the effectiveness of these controls. For most 
large firms, the deadline to implement effective controls either has passed or will pass soon. 
 
 SOX gives the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) overall responsibility for 
implementing the law. The SEC, in turn, created the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) to develop specific rules and oversight functions to implement Sarbanes-Oxley. 
 
 Although SOX was a response to specific high-profile cases of fraud, fraud in financial 
reporting has long been a major problem. In 2004, fraud through financial statements represented 
only 7% of all fraud cases studied in an ACFE survey [ACFE, 2004], but the median fraud loss 
for financial fraud was a million dollars, compared to a median loss of only $100,000 for frauds 
in general. 
 
Other Regulations 
 
 Although SOX has received the most attention, a number of other recent pieces of 
legislation have required corporations to reconsider their financial systems and other information 
systems. 
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SEC Accelerated Filing Deadlines 
 
 Beginning in December 2002, the SEC has required firms to reduce the time they may 
take to produce their quarterly and annual reports. These tighter time limits will make designing 
controls more, difficult because there will be less time to check for errors and violations. 
 
IAS/IFRS 
 
 In accounting, U.S. accounting standards are set by the U.S. Federal Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB), which creates the generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP). In 
Europe, the International Accounting Standards (lAS) will have to be followed by U.S. firms 
operating in Europe, including the finance-specific International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). 
 
SAS 99 
 
 In 2002, shortly after Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted, the Auditing Standards Board 
produced Statement on Auditing Standards 99 (SAS 99), Consideration of'Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit [Auditing Standards Board, 2002]. As its name suggests, this standard requires 
auditors to search aggressively for fraud. We will look at SAS 99 later in our discussion of fraud 
control. 
 
Basel II 
 
 Banks who do business internationally will also have to comply with the Basel II accord. 
Basel II requires banks to have capital reserves to cover probable risks. Banks that do not have 
solid financial reporting systems or risk controls in place must set aside more capital reserves. 
This reduces the amount of loans they can support, and this in turn limits profits. Basel II gives 
banks a direct incentive to invest in internal controls to reduce risks. 
 
Privacy Laws 
 
 Several laws have affected requirements for privacy and for the disclosure of private 
information. These include the following: 
 
• The European Union (E. U.) Data Protection Directive of 2002 is a broad set of rules 
ensuring privacy rights in Europe. 
 
• Although the E. U. Data Protection Directive is the most important international privacy 
rule, many other nations with which U.S. firms do business are also developing strong 
commercial data privacy laws. 
 
• The U.S. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 requires strong data protection in 
financial institutions. 
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• The U.S. Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 
requires strong protection for private data in health care organizations. 
 
• The U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 gives the U.S. government broad powers to see personal 
data. 
 
The Compliance Age 
 
 These laws and many others have made compliance a major issue for information systems 
in all corporations. Unfortunately, IS education has not kept pace with the growing importance of 
compliance in IT management. 
 
Control Frameworks 
 
 To achieve compliance with SOX and other crucial regulations, companies typically 
adopt a control framework. Control frameworks help organizations understand all of the things 
that they need to do and how to do these things. 
 
Types of Controls 
 
 All of these frameworks focus on controls. Earlier, we saw in Figure I that the purpose of 
controls is to help organizations keep their organizational processes on track to achieve the firm's 
goals. Figure I also shows that controls generally fall into one of three categories. 
 
• Preventive controls attempt to keep deviations from occurring in the first place. In movie 
theaters, one person sells tickets but another collects them. This is the segregation of 
duties. Unless the two parties collude, the person accepting the money for tickets cannot 
collect money, pocket it, and then allow the person in without giving them a ticket. 
 
• Detective controls attempt to detect deviations when they occur, so that action can be 
taken. Periodic reconciliations between independent processes will make it likely that 
deviations in one of the processes will be revealed. In the case of movie theaters, 
management reconciles the number of tickets sold with the number of tickets collected at 
the end of each day. 
 
• In some cases, there are corrective controls, which fix deviations. The restoration of 
backup files on a computer compromised by an attack is a corrective control. 
 
 This taxonomy is not perfect. For instance, if people realize that detective controls are in 
place, this should deter them from misbehavior, and this would be a preventative control. 
However, the general concept of preventative, detective, and corrective controls is useful in 
practice. 
 
Coso 
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 For Sarbanes-Oxley, the PCAOB explicitly requires corporations to use a welldeveloped 
comprehensive control framework. Although the PCAOB does not require corporations to use a 
specific framework, it has specifically listed only a single framework as acceptable, and most 
companies are using this framework to implement SOX. This is the COSO framework. 
 
The COSO Framework 
 
 Although COSO is universally known by its acronym, the COSO framework actually is a 
document called Internal Control-Internal Framework [COSO, 1994]. The acronym COSO comes 
from the organization that created the document, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of 
the Treadway Commission (www.coso.org). 
 
Objectives 
 
 Control frameworks, as shown in Figure 1, require objectives. In the COSO framework, 
there are three objectives. 
 
• Operations. The firm wishes to operate effectively and efficiently. It is necessary for the 
finn to control its general internal operations to do this. 
 
• Financial Reporting. The firm must create accurate financial reports. This, of course, is 
the focus of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
 
• Compliance. The firm wishes to be in compliance with external regulation. In this paper, 
we are only directly concerned with SOX compliance. 
 
Reasonable Assurance 
 
 Good controls cannot completely guarantee that goals will be met. However, an effective 
control environment will give reasonable assurance that goals will be met. 
 
COSO Framework Components 
 
 Figure 4 shows the COSO framework. It shows that the framework has five components. 
These are components rather than phases because there is no time ordering among them. Each 
must occur simultaneously, and each feeds into others constantly. 
 
Figure 4: The COSO Framework 
 
• Control Environment. The component at the base of the COSO framework is the 
corporation's control environment. This is the company's overall control culture. It 
includes the "tone at the top" set by top management, the company's commitment to 
training employees in the importance of control, the punishment of employees (including 
senior managers) who violate control rules, attention by the board of directors, and other 
broad matters. If the broad control environment is weak, other control elements are not 
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likely to be effective. 
 
• Risk Assessment. More specifically, a company needs to assess the risks that it faces. 
Without systematic risk analysis, it is impossible to understand what level of controls to 
apply to individual assets. Risk assessment must be an ongoing preoccupation for the firm 
because the risk environment constantly changes. 
 
• Control Activities. An organization will spend most of its control effort on the control 
activities that actually implement and maintain controls. This includes such things as 
approvals and authorization, IT security, the separation of duties, and other matters we 
will look at later. Controls usually have two elements. One is a general policy, which tells 
what must be done. The other is procedures, which tell how to do it. 
 
• Monitoring. Having controls in place means nothing if organizations do not monitor and 
enforce them. Monitoring includes both human vigilance and audit trails in information 
technology. It is essential to have an independent monitoring function that is free to 
report on problems even if these problems deal with senior management. 
 
• Information and Communication. For the control envirom-nent, risk assessment, control 
activities, and monitoring to work well, the company needs to ensure that it has the 
required information and communication across all levels of the corporations. 
 
Types of Control Activities 
 
 Internal Control-Internal Framework [COSO, 1994] does not list a comprehensive set of 
control activities, probably because it is impossible to create a complete list of possible controls. 
However, the document does provide several lists of types of control activities. For instance, on 
Page 49, the framework notes the existence of manual controls, computer controls, and 
management controls. On the following page, it provides the following list to consider: 
 
• Top Level Review-comparing budgets with actual performance, tightly monitoring major 
initiatives, and so forth. 
 
• Direct Functional or Activity Management-managers who run individual operations must 
examine the appropriate reports for their level, for instance, loan performance in a bank's 
lending operations. 
 
• Information Processing, including the enforcement of manual procedures, such as 
checking if a customer's accounts payable are not above a certain amount before 
accepting an order. Note that information processing must focus on business processes, 
not merely on IT processes. 
 
• Physical Controls-inventories, locked cash drawers, write-only archival media, and so 
forth. 
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• Performance Indicators-Relating different sets of data to each other to check for 
inconsistencies, noting deviations from normal performance (in either direction), unusual 
trends, and so forth. 
 
• Segregation of Duties - requiring most sensitive processes to be completed by two or 
more people, so that no single person can engage in improper activities without this 
becoming apparent. For instance, one person may purchase and order, but another person 
will record it. Alternatively, no single person can both authorize and make a purchase. 
 
Controls for Information Systems 
 
 On Pages 52-55, the document lists some controls over information systems. At a most 
basic level, the framework discusses the differences between application controls and general 
controls. Application controls, as the name suggests, involve individual applications (accounting 
applications, spreadsheets, and so forth), including manual operations in using them. This 
includes interfaces to other systems for input data, checks on input, internal checks during 
processing to flag errors and misbehavior, and so forth. 
 
 General controls cover everything beneath the applications-computers, operating systems, 
the network, and so forth, together with manual operations in using them. This includes making 
purchases, application systems development, maintenance, access controls, evaluating packets 
software, and so forth. The controls needed in individual applications will depend on the quality 
of general controls. 
 
Controls over "Evolving Issues" 
 
 The report spends approximately half of Page 55 on "evolving issues." Two brief 
paragraphs are devoted to end-user computing (EUC). The first paragraph simply says that EUC 
exists. The second give the following meager guidance: 
 
 To provide needed control for EUC systems, entity-wide policies for system 
development, maintenance, and operation should be implemented and enforced. Local processing 
environments should be governed by a level of control activities similar to the more traditional 
mainframe environment. (COSO, 1994, p. 55) 
 
 Internal Control-Integratedftamework does not give any specific guidance on 
spreadsheets. In fact, it does not mention them. In general, this is an old (1994) document that 
was written before spreadsheets become important, or, probably more correctly, before IT control 
professionals realized that spreadsheets were important. 
 
CobiT 
 
 COSO is a general control planning and assessment tool for corporations. For IT controls, 
there is a more specific framework, CobiT (Control Objectivesfor Information and Related 
Technologies) (IT Governance Institute, 2000). The IT Governance Institute has not only created 
the control objectives framework. The institute also has developed detailed guidance for 
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implementing the CobiT framework. 
 
The CobiT Framework 
 
 Figure 5 illustrates the CobiT framework. This framework has four major domains: 
 
Figure 5: COSO/CobiT Framework 
 
• Planning and Organization. The four domains follow the IT life cycle. The planning and 
organization domain has I I high-level control objectives that cover everything from 
strategic IP planning and the creation of a corporate information architecture to the 
planning of specific projects. 
 
• Acquisition and Implementation. After planning, companies need to acquire and 
implement information systems. This domain has six high-level control objectives. 
 
• Delivery and Support. Most of an IT project's life takes place after it implementation. 
Consequently, the CobiT framework has 13 high-level control objectives for delivery and 
support. This is more than any other domain. 
 
• Monitoring. Finally, firms must monitor their processes, assessing the adequacy of 
internal controls, obtaining independent assurance, and providing for independent audit. 
 
Although the four domains define the scope of CobiT, they are only the beginning of CobiT. 
Beneath the four domains are 34 high-level control objectives, which Figure 5 also shows. 
Beneath these, in turn, are more than 300 detailed control objectives. CobiT also includes many 
documents that help organizations understand how to implement the framework. 
 
Dominance in the United States 
 
 The IT Governance Institute is the child of the Information Systems Audit and Control 
Association (ISACA). ISACA, in turn, is the primary professional association for IT audit 
professionals in the United States. The association's certified information systems auditor (CISA) 
certification is the dominant certification for U.S. IS auditors, so it is not surprising that CobiT 
has become the dominant framework for auditing IT controls in the United States. 
 
COSO and CobiT 
 
 Obviously, both COSO and CobiT pertain to information technology used in financial 
reporting. Figure 5 shows how CobiT relates to COSO at a broad level. This figure illustrates that 
it is relatively simple to combine COSO with CobiT at a conceptual level, although the details are 
anything but simple. 
 
Other Frameworks 
 
 Although COSO and CobiT have dominated Sarbanes-Oxley planning in the United 
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States, other planning frameworks are also important. 
 
ISO/1EC 17799 
 
 Figure 6 shows the relationship between COSO, CobiT and three other frameworks-
ISO/IEC 17799, Common Criteria, and ITIL. The figure emphasizes that the three frameworks 
overlap but focus on somewhat different things. 
 
Figure 6: COSO, CohiT, 17799, Common Criteria, and ITIL 
 
For example, CobiT, as its name implies, focuses specifically on controlling the entire IT 
process, while COSO focuses more broadly on financial reporting controls. In contrast, ISO/IEC 
17799, Code ofPracticefor Information Security Practice (ISOJEC, 2000), as its name suggests, 
focuses more narrowly, on IT security. Security is part of IT controls, of course, so 17799 can 
help in creating IT controls. 
 
ISO/lEC 17799 grew out of an earlier standards effort by the British Standards Institute. In 
1995, the Institute produced BS 7999. This standard has two parts. ISO and the IEC adopted Part 
I as 17799. This first part is a broad code of practice. 
 
For organizations wishing certification of their standards effort, Part 11 of 7999 
(Information Security Management System) has auditable controls. Consequently, many 
companies have chosen to be compliant with 17799 by being certified in Part 11 of 7999. 
 
In other frameworks, including COSO and CobiT, companies certify themselves, 
sometimes with the concurrence of an external auditor. They lack 17799's third-party 
certification process, which external parties may value highly. 
 
Even 17799 is quite complex. Broadly, it has ten major categories' of standards. It 
subdivides these into 127 specific controls. At the time of this writing, 17799 is in flux. ISO is 
preparing to release a new version in mid-2005. Although there has been much speculation about 
the revisions in the standard, it seems best to hold comments until the final 2005 version. In 
addition, it seems likely that ISO and IEC will adopt BS 7999 Part 11 as an ISO standard. Again, 
however, we must wait for ISO and IEC to act. 
 
Common Criteria 
 
Figure 6 shows that the Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408, Information technology --
Security techniques -- Evaluation criteriafor IT security) standard is even more specific, 
Common Criteria specifically focuses on the evaluation of security products, such as firewalls. It 
provides a way for purchasers to know specifically what security features a security product 
claims to offer and how rigorously the product was developed. However, the Common Criteria 
approach has somewhat limited use because it is difficult to apply and does not provide a high 
level of assurance that a product actually is secure. 
 
ITIL 
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Another framework for IT is the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL). 
ITIL is a broad set of best practices guidelines for providing IT services. It is widely used in 
Europe and is becoming popular elsewhere. ITIL is highly processoriented, specifying systematic 
approaches to implementing security and other IT services. ITIL best practices may be helpful in 
implementing other guidelines. However, ITIL does not have the detailed guidance necessary for 
developing and implementing IT financial reporting controls. 
 
1 Security Organization (including relationships with third parties and outsourcers). Security Policies (to provide 
management direction and support). Asset Classification and Control. System Development and Maintenance 
(building in security). System Access Control (prevention and detection of unauthorized access). Computer and 
Network Management. Physical and Environmental Security, Compliance (avoiding breaches of laws). Personnel 
Security (to reduce human errors, fraud, theft, or unauthorized usage). Business Continuity Planning. 
 
Spreadsheet-Specific Guidance 
 
If one does an Internet search with the terms "spreadsheet" and "Sarbanes," there will be 
many hits. Nearly all of these, however, are about spreadsheets used to document SOX 
compliance, not how to control spreadsheets used in financial reporting. 
 
The one major exception to this silence on spreadsheet control for Sarbanes-Oxley is a 
six-page report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers [20041. This report lists a large number of controls. 
The first step is to inventory all of a firm's spreadsheets that are "in scope," that is, are used in 
financial reporting. Next steps are to evaluate the riskiness of these spreadsheets, determine 
necessary controls, evaluate the existing (as-is) controls on these spreadsheets, and develop 
action plans for remediating control deficiencies. Once concern is the report's method for 
assessing riskiness. It lists nine factors to consider when evaluating the "risk and significance" of 
a spreadsheet: 
 
• Complexity of the spreadsheet and calculations 
 
• Purpose and use of the spreadsheet 
 
• Number of spreadsheet users 
 
• Type of potential input, logic, and interface errors Size of the spreadsheet 
 
• Degree of understanding and documentation of the spreadsheet requirements by the 
developer 
 
• Uses of the spreadsheet's output 
 
• Frequency and extent of changes and modifications to the spreadsheet 
 
• Development, developer (and training) and testing of the spreadsheet before it is utilized 
 
Although this is a good list, it appears to be based on an incorrect view of spreadsheet 
errors. Research indicates that the largest indicator of the number of errors in a spreadsheet is 
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simply the length of the spreadsheet. There will be errors in about 2% of all fon-nula cells if there 
is no deep testing. This also is the case in programming. However, from programming, we know 
that more complex programs have more errors than simpler programs, but only by a factor of 
about four [Zage & Zage, 1993]. Consequently, long simple spreadsheets will have many more 
errors than short complex programs. Certainly, reporting complexity first and size half way down 
the list is a concern. 
 
Even more of a concern is placing testing last in the list. As discussed in the following 
sections, a lack of testing is a devastating control deficiency, not simply one part of a last concern 
on a list. 
 
The report also lists a number of controls that should be considered to mitigate risks 
inherent in the spreadsheet environment. 
 
• Change control: the authorization of change requests, testing the spreadsheet, and formal 
sign-off by another individual. 
 
• Version control: Ensuring that only the current and approved version of each spreadsheet is 
used. Naming conventions that include version numbers and dates and the use of structured 
directories can help in this. 
 
• Access control: assign appropriate access rights to people who need to use the spreadsheet. 
Use a password to control access. 
 
• Input: Whether manual or automatic data entry is used, there should be reconciliations. 
 
• Security and data integrity: storing spreadsheets in protected directories, and locking 
formula cells to prevent logic changes. 
 
• Documentation: Ensure that the business objective and functions of the spreadsheets are 
understandable. 
 
• Development life cycle: Use a standard systems development life cycle. The report 
specifically says that testing is critical (but does not discuss how to do testing). 
 
• Backup and Archiving: spreadsheets should be backed up because of their sensitivity. They 
should be archived in read-only fonriat for later review. 
 
• Logic inspection by an independent person other than the developer: The report does not 
discuss how logic inspection is different from testing. Probably, testing is taken as what we 
call execution testing later in this paper. The report appears to sanction logic checking by a 
single individual. As discussed later, this appears to be unwise. 
 
• Segregation of duties/roles, and procedures: There should be authorities, roles, and 
procedures for ownership, sign-off, and other matters. This item is so brief in the report that 
it provides little guidance. 
Sarbanes-Oxley: What About All the Spreadsheets? 
Raymond R.. Panko & Nicholas Ordway 
 
 18 
 
• Analytics, In accounting, "analytics" refers to calculations built into spreadsheets (ratios, 
cross-checks, statistical patterns, etc.) that help detect errors and fraud. 
 
The report says that firms should enforce these controls. For instance, changes should be 
made independently in two copies of each spreadsheet, and the two copies should be compared. 
In another example, a sample of cells can be tested to ensure that they are password-protected if 
they should be. In addition, names should include modification dates, and names should be 
compared with modification dates as recorded by the operating system. 
 
Finally, the report gives a number of suggestions for remediation. Specific responsibilities 
should be assigned to specific people, remediation efforts should be prioritized, and remediation 
deadlines should be established. 
 
Although this report offers valuable advice, its error beliefs are inadequately, and its lack of 
detail leave many questions unanswered. One important concern is testing. We will discuss 
testing in some detail in this paper. Another issue is how to control manual processes in 
spreadsheet usage. 
 
The Testing Control 
 
Although spreadsheets need many controls, we will focus on testing because of testing's 
extreme importance in software quality assurance. 
 
Although fault rates in programming are very similar to error rates in spreadsheet models, 
programmers and spreadsheet developers react very differently to these defect rates. 
Programmers, appalled by their fault rates, spend a great deal of time on programming. In a 
sample of 84 projects in 27 organizations, Jones [1998] found that the amount of time spent in 
testing to reduce errors ranged from 27% to 34% depending on program difficulty. In every case, 
subjects reported that insufficient time was planned for testing (p. 139). In another study, 
Kimberland [2004] found that Microsoft software development teams spent 40% to 60% of their 
total working time in testing. 
 
The situation in spreadsheet development is very different. As noted earlier, studies since 
the earliest days of spreadsheet development have found that few organizations have policies 
requiring extensive testing and that few spreadsheet developers test their spreadsheets intensively 
in ways similar to those that programmers use. 
 
Testing in Software Development 
 
Both field audits [see Figure 3] and experiments [Panko 2005b] have shown that 
spreadsheet models and software programs are very similar in error rates and error types. 
Consequently, to get insight into spreadsheet testing, it would be good to understand software 
testing. 
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Execution Testing 
 
There are two general ways to test software for errors. One is to use execution testing, in 
which the tester assembles a large number of test values with known results and runs these test 
numbers through the program as input values. We will discuss execution testing again under 
spreadsheet testing. 
 
Code Inspection  
 
Another method is code inspection, which Fagin [ 1976] developed. In code inspection, a 
group of testers independently examines a program line by line looking for errors. They then 
meet to compare their results and attempt to find new errors. Although variations on this basic 
pattern exist, all code inspection methods involve groupwork and line-by-line code examination. 
 
One tenet of code inspection methodologies is that testers should report their results. The 
programming inspection data in Panko [2005a] are extensive because so many code inspection 
studies have reported their results. This reporting is important because it forces software 
developers to face error rates directly. 
 
Code Inspection Parameters 
 
Fagin [ 1976], based on his personal experiences implementing code inspection, 
emphasized several principles for code inspection. Subsequent experience has reinforced his 
insights. 
 
• Module Size. Perhaps the most important thing is to test small modules rather than entire 
programs. A typical module size is 100 to 200 lines of code. Although there disagreement 
about the optimal module size, there is no doubt that keeping modules small is important. 
For instance, Bernard and Price [1994] found that code inspectors found 72% more errors 
when modules were shorter. If the module is too long, the tester will not be able to maintain 
his or her focus during testing. 
 
• Inspection Rates. Another key principle is that inspections should not be rushed. Inspection 
rates often are measured as lines of code inspected per hour. Basili and Pericone [ 1993 ] 
found that when the inspection rate rose from 50 lines per hour to 200 lines per hour, the 
detected fault rate fell from 1.6% to only 0.6%. This was not because programs had fewer 
faults but because faster inspection detected fewer errors. Russell [ 1991 ] found an even 
sharper drop in detection when the inspection rate rose from 150 lines per hour to 750 lines 
per hour. Ebenau and Strauss [ 1994] found that "hasty" code inspections found errors in 
1.3% of the lines of code they examined, while non-hasty code inspection found errors in 
2.0% of all lines of code. Weller [ 1993 ] also found sharp drops in detection rates as 
inspection rates increased. Levy and Begin [ 1984], in research on proofreading, similarly 
found that faster proofreading speed substantially reduced the percentage of spelling errors 
detected. 
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• Formula Inspection Speed. One thing that has not been studied in the code inspection 
literature but that probably is important is the need to slow down even further for complex 
equations. In proofreading, Healey [ 1980] looked at error detection for nonword errors 
(errors that do create a dictionary word) in prose for varying word lengths. Detection rates 
were over 90% for words of 2, 3 or 4 letters. For longer words, however, detection rates 
were only about 75%. Panko [ 1999], in a study of spreadsheet code inspection, found that 
error detection rates for long formulas were much lower than for shorter formulas. Just as 
drivers should slow down for hazardous road conditions but rarely do [e.g., Howarth, 1988; 
Svenson, 1977], code inspectors need to force themselves to slow down for long formulas. 
 
• Team Size. Another tenet of code inspection is that code inspection must be done by groups 
rather than by single inspectors. Weller [ 1993 1, who analyzed more than6,000 code 
inspection studies, found that teams of four found 29% to 108% more errors than teams of 
three depending on the inspection rate. This limited ability of individuals to find errors also 
been seen in laboratory code inspection experiments. In these experiments, subjects found 
only 22% [Johnson & Tjahjono, 1997], a third [Myers, 1978] and a half [Basili & Selby, 
1986] of the programming faults seeded in a test program. When Johnson and Tjahjono [ 
1997] had subjects work in groups of three, detection rate doubled. In two spreadsheet code 
inspection studies, Galletta et al. [ 1992, 1997] found that individual detection rates for a 
spreadsheet seeded with errors were only 5 1 % and 66% in the two studies. In another 
study using a similar spreadsheet [Panko, 1999], individuals only found 63% of all errors, 
while groups of three found 83%. Although this seems like a modest increase, this increase 
came precisely in the errors that individuals were least likely to detect. Steiner [ 197 1 ] 
developed a theory of why groupwork is effective. He noted that groupwork is more 
important for difficult problems than for easy problems. 
 
• Team Composition. It is sometimes said that people who develop code should not be on the 
inspection team because people are not good at finding their own errors. However, 
proofreading research suggests differently. Daneman and Stainton [ 1993 found that when 
proofreading took place twenty minutes after writing, individuals found only 59% of their 
own word errors but found 76% of word errors made by others. However, when 
proofreading took place two weeks later, people had higher success reading their own work 
than did others (83% rather than 68%). If inspection takes place some time after 
development, individuals should be able to be effective at code inspecting their own work, 
although this hypothesis has not been tested in programming or spreadsheet development. 
 
• Reasonable Expectations for Detection Yields. The reason for the use of team code 
inspection is that humans are only moderately good at finding errors. This has been seen in 
many areas of human cognition, such as proofreading [Panko 2005a]. Team inspection can 
correct more errors, but even team inspection is far from perfect. Jones [ 1988], based on 
extensive experience, estimated that each formal code inspection only detects about 60% of 
all errors (p. 199). McCormick [1983] found that code inspections he studied found 86% of 
all errors, based on the number of errors found later. Boehm and Basili [2001 ], based on 
their experiences with many studies, reported that peer reviews only caught a median of 
60% of all errors and that this yield ranged from 3 1 % to 89%. At a CeBASE [2001 ] 
workshop, participants shared data from several studies, collectively indicating that 60% or 
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more defects usually are found in inspections. Due to limited error detection rates, 
programming projects have to have several rounds of inspection. Studies of late inspections 
after multiple rounds of inspections still find errors in 0. 1% to 0.3 % of all lines of code 
[Putnam & Myers, 1992]. Given that most studies of initial code inspection find errors in 
2% of all lines of code, this data suggests that even multiple rounds of code inspection only 
find about 90% of all errors. 
 
• Improvement Takes Time. It would be nice if companies could learn to do code inspection 
quickly. However, experience has shown that improvement is likely totake two or more years 
[Haley 1996, Spencer 19931. In general, it takes considerable time for people to become 
competent in complex skills. For instance, it takes about two years of driving before people 
cease being menaces on the highway, [Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1993]. In addition, once 
people are skilled, it may be a considerable period of time before the organization becomes 
competent using new methods. 
 
Testing Spreadsheets 
 
From the information just presented, it is clear that spreadsheet errors are a serious threat in 
all large spreadsheets. In software development, where fault rates are similar to error rates in 
spreadsheet development, most companies mandate a very disciplined development process. This 
process involves several well-controlled stages, including requirements definition, design, 
coding, and testing. All of these stages are important, but the biggest reductions in error rates in 
programming come from testing. This includes both design reviews and coding tests, but we will 
focus on coding tests. As noted earlier, approximately 30% of all software project effort is 
devoted to testing. 
 
Whiskey Cures 
 
Ineffective home remedies sometimes are called "whiskey cures," after the old aphorism, 
"Of all the things that do not cure the common cold, whiskey is the most popular." With a 
whiskey cure, you take a step to reduce harm, but the step is largely or entirely ineffective. One 
commonly seen activity in spreadsheet development is looking over a spreadsheet's results for 
reasonableness [Hendry & Green, 1994; Nardi & Miller, 199 1 ]. If a few errors are found, the 
seeker feels that he or she is very effective at finding errors. If no errors are found, then the 
seeker feels that the spreadsheet is free of error. Unfortunately, given the difficulty of finding 
errors noted above even when full cell- by-cell code inspection is used, merely looking over a 
spreadsheet's numbers for reasonableness is a whiskey cure. In addition, studies [Klein, 1997; 
Rickets, 19901 have shown that people are not very good at finding errors when they assess 
numbers for correctness. Although looking over results for reasonableness is simple and 
inexpensive and should be done, it must not be considered an acceptable stopping point. 
 
Another whiskey cure is depending upon developers to test their own spreadsheets during 
development. However, testing during development is neither new nor very effective. When 
Allwood [ 1984] watched students working on algebra problems, he noted that they frequently 
stopped to go back and check their work. In some cases, they did this when they thought they 
had made an error. In other cases, they performed what Allwood called a standard check, going 
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back over their work on general principles. Hayes and Flower [ 1980] saw that when people write 
they constantly shift among planning, writing, and reviewing activities. Reviewing is like the 
standard check in Allwood's study. Kellog [ 1994] found that people spend 20% to 25% of their 
time of their writing time reviewing, In an earlier study cited in his 1994 paper, Kellog found that 
sbjects spent 19% of their time reviewing and also found that reviewing increased as writing time 
increased. 
 
In spreadsheeting, Panko and Halverson [ 1997] also watched many of their individual subjects 
and groups during spreadsheet development. They also noted frequent error checking during 
development but only rare post-development testing. However, many errors remained undetected 
despite this type of review during development. 
 
Execution Testing 
 
A common form of software testing is execution testing, in which the tester inputs values 
that have known output and observes whether the program gives the correct results. This 
approach seems obvious, but it often is very difficult to do well. In many cases, the spreadsheet is 
doing calculations that have never been done before. Consequently, finding the correct output 
values for test cases may not be feasible or may be prohibitively difficult. 
 
In addition, determining proper test cases is a subtle skill. Most people tend to pick test 
cases that will prove a program to be correct. This is in line with the human confirmation bias 
[Snyder & Campbell 1980]. Proper execution testing, however, requires the tester to select cases 
that are likely to break the program. This requires a great deal of training and experience. 
Unfortunately, spreadsheet developers rarely have the proper training and experience. 
 
Overall, execution testing in spreadsheet development is likely to be most effective for 
testing changes to spreadsheets. After a spreadsheet is developed and tested, test cases should be 
developed, and the actual values should be taken as correct values. If the spreadsheet is modified 
afterwards, the test cases should be rerun. Variables that should not change due to the 
modifications should be the same as the original values. If they are not, this will indicate an error. 
 
Code Inspection 
 
Although spreadsheet developers are not likely to be good at developing test cases for 
execution testing, they are likely to be quite good at code inspection. They usually are subject 
experts in the content domain of the spreadsheet. This means that they are likely to understand 
both the formulas in the spreadsheet and the flow of logic among the formula cells. 
 
Given the threat analysis presented earlier and the discussion of software code inspection 
presented earlier, spreadsheet code inspection should have the following characteristics. This is 
not a complete list, but it emphasizes the points that are likely to be the most difficult to 
implement. 
 
• Inspect All Cells. There is no excuse to say that code inspecting all cells is impractical. 
Not doing it guarantees an unacceptable error rate. In addition, if programmers can do it, 
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spreadsheet developers can do it. Unless code inspection inspects all cells, it is a whiskey 
cure. 
 
• Use Group Inspection. A single person will be unable to find many errors in a 
spreadsheet. The only question is how large the group should be. As noted earlier, Panko 
[ 1999] found that the detection rate rose from 63% to 83% when individuals gave way to 
groups of three. If this finding holds, then larger groups will be desirable. 
 
• Inspect Modules. Trying to inspect an entire spreadsheet is a guaranteed route to failure. 
Inspections should be conducted on each module after it is developed. The optimum 
module size is unknown, but in Panko's [ 1999] experiment, a spreadsheet with only 
about 20 unique formulas took students approximately 45 minutes to inspect. A 
maximum inspection time for a module is about two hours if attention is to be preserved, 
so optimum module sizes are likely to be fairly small. Most spreadsheets will have many 
modules and so will require many inspections. The optimum size in terms of cost and 
detection rates needs to be determined empirically. 
 
• Slow down for complex formulas. As noted earlier, Panko's [1999] study showed that 
inspection success falls for cells that contain longer formulas. It seems likely that when 
inspectors reach longer formulas, they should slow down their testing rate dramatically. 
 
• Multiple Rounds of Inspection. If program inspection is a good indicator, each round of 
inspection is only likely to detect 60% to 80% of all errors, and achieving even these 
levels is likely to require considerable experience. 
 
Actual Testing 
 
How do real-world companies do testing? As noted earlier, when the first author asked 
financial professionals and officers whether their firms did testing for material spreadsheet, most 
did not, but a small subset said that they did. However, the next question asked respondents how 
they actually tested their spreadsheets of material importance in financial reporting. As Figure 7 
shows, 73% of the respondents said that when their firms test spreadsheets of material 
importance, they test only some cells. In other words, they consider "looking the spreadsheet 
over" to be testing. Only 12% said that their firm tested all cells in the spreadsheet, and only 2% 
said that their firm used both multiple testers and cell-by-cell testing. 
 
Figure 7: Testing Methods for Material Financial Spreadsheets 
 
Spreadsheet Auditing Programs 
 
One possible approach to testing is to use spreadsheet auditing programs that are designed 
to find errors in spreadsheet programs automatically. Obviously, using a spreadsheet auditing 
program is faster and less expensive than manual code inspection. 
 
Unfortunately, to borrow a term used in U.S. prescription drug regulations, spreadsheet 
auditing programs have not been proven to be "safe and effective." No research known to the 
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authors has established what percentage of errors auditing programs will find. Unless this 
percentage is very high, it will not be safe to use spreadsheet auditing programs in lieu of full 
manual code inspection. 
 
To give an analogy, spelling checkers in word processing programs will catch all spelling 
errors in which the mistyped word is not a dictionary word. However, if the word is in the 
dictionary, the spelling checker will ignore it completely. Proofreading research has shown that 
the foriner type of error is, also easiest type of spelling error for humans to detect. Grammar 
checkers, in turn, are frustrating for missing grammar errors and for calling correct grammar 
incorrect. 
 
We suspect that auditing programs will be even less precise than grammar checkers. They 
are unlikely to be able to find omission errors, such as if the developer leaves out paying the 
monthly rent. Nor are they likely to be able to catch most logical formula errors based on the use 
of the wrong algorithm or the incorrect expression of an algorithm. Errors in typing numbers are 
also likely to escape these programs. It seems like they would be best in pointing errors, but these 
are quite uncommon [Panko & Halverson, 1997, 2000]. In programming, Endress [ 1975] found 
that 48% of all errors are problem misunderstandings. In spreadsheet development, auditing 
programs are not likely to be effective with such errors. 
 
In general, because there are multiple types of errors, almost any error reduction or 
detection method is likely to be limited. Beizer's [1990] Pesticide Paradox reflects this problem 
of multiplicity in dealing with errors in the context of programming: "Every method you use to 
prevent or find bugs leaves a residue of subtler bugs against which those methods are 
ineffective." 
 
In marketing materials, spreadsheet auditing programs focus on the ability to detect 
patterns in how blocks of cells are laid out and on certain types of link geometries. Panko [2000] 
has listed the most common errors for two spreadsheet development tasks. Few of these errors 
seem amenable to detection based on geometry. 
 
The most common advice to writers is to use automated spelling and grammar checking 
functions for "pre-proofing" of a document before full manual proofreading is done. The same 
may be the case with automated spreadsheet auditing programs. 
 
Fortunately, Excel has a number of pre-auditing tools that can be used by everyone. Excel 
tags many questionable formulas with green comment markers. By going to Tools, Error 
Checking, the user can step through these potential errors in order. One choice usually is 
Evaluate Formula, which steps the auditor through a formula's calculation term by term. 
 
In addition, for manual code inspection, a user can see the precedents of a formula (cells to 
which a formula refers) by double-clicking on a formula cell or clicking on the cell and hitting 
F2. Cell references and the cells or ranges to which they refer are shown in the same color. 
 
By bringing up the formula auditing toolbar (View, Tool Bars, Formula Auditing) the user 
will have several options, including showing subsequent formulas that refer to a particular 
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formula (decedents). A cell with no decedents has to be a bottom-line value. Any cell in a 
spreadsheet that is not a bottom-line value yet has no decedents is suspicious. 
 
Other Error Controls 
 
Although we have focused on testing as a sine qua non for reducing errors, other controls 
are needed to achieve low error rates. 
 
Design and Design Reviews 
 
In programming, the standard systems development life cycle calls for strong initial 
planning, in which the systems analyst determines needs, in which a programmer creates a design 
for the program, and in which the organization conducts a design review. Errors found during 
design reviews are much less expensive to fix than errors in later phases, especially coding. 
Studies [McCormick, 1983; Jones, 1986] have found that more errors occur during the requirements 
and design stages than during the coding phase, so design reviews should be able to reduce error 
reduction costs considerably. 
 
Unfortunately, not only is design review rare in spreadsheet development but design itself 
tends to be limited. In experiments, observations of people developing reasonably challenging 
spreadsheets has shown that almost all subjects begin entering labels, numbers, and formulas 
within a minute or two at most [Brown & Gould 1987, Panko & Halverson 1997, Takaki 2005]. 
 
Given the cost effectiveness of design reviews and the danger of creating difficult-to- 
understand spreadsheets if there is insufficient planning, companies need to develop mandatory 
design and design review processes for all nontrivial spreadsheets. 
 
At the same time, when people develop spreadsheets, they may not understand the situation 
fully. The process of building the spreadsheet model itself may be the best way to understand the 
situation [Panko 1988] because the developer can work until hitting a snag that must be addressed 
or because the developer may begin to develop a spreadsheet and realize that the initial design 
will not work. In addition, as the user begins to do calculations, he or she might find surprising 
results. These results can lead to new directions in design. Similarly, in writing, Kellog [ 1994] 
noted that inspiration generates production, which generates more inspiration. 
 
Of course, spreadsheets that grow "organically" may have many design and construction 
flaws. One possibility is to use such spreadsheets as prototypes and then to build production 
systems from scratch, using the prototype's general design. However, this takes a great deal of 
discipline. In writing, Flower and Hayes [ 1980] have suggested that writers should have "plans 
that are detailed enough to test, but cheap enough to throw away." The same should be true for 
spreadsheet developers. 
 
No matter how the overall spreadsheet is designed, it seems important to design individual 
formulas before constructing them. The first author's observations of laboratory subjects 
developing spreadsheets indicated that they often entered a formula                                                                         
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they were not sure of and then looked at the results to see if they looked right. This "ready, fire, 
aim" approach is fast, but it is not safe. 
 
Formula Protection 
 
As noted earlier, users sometimes "hardwire" spreadsheets by typing numbers into formula 
cells. Dent [ 1994] reported that hardwiring was very common in a mining firm. In another case, 
Rabbit Photo in Australia uses a spreadsheet program for budget and expense consolidation. The 
company found that users were constantly overwriting formula cells to enter "correct" values. 
When the company turned on cell protection to prevent the overwriting of formulas, users turned 
off protection and made their changes anyway. The company eventually moved to a centralized 
software package with a spreadsheet-like interface. Users could not overwrite formulas in this 
program. Today, companies can use passwords to prevent users from turning off cell protection, 
but this will require the selection of good passwords. Given the wide extent of the hardwiring 
problem, companies need to address cell protection actively. 
 
Readability 
 
In a badly constructed spreadsheet, readability will be so poor that testing will be extremely 
difficult. It is important to implement controls to ensure readability. 
 
• Modules. Testing requires reasonable-sized modules. Consequently, it is important to 
develop spreadsheet models as a group of modules. This can also improve readability. 
 
• Flow. In most countries, we read from left to right and then from top to bottom. It is 
important for readability to have this type of clear basic flow in the spreadsheet's logic. 
Boehm and Basili [20011 found that good architecture in programming can reduce error 
correction time dramatically. In spreadsheets, Saariluoma [ 1989] found that poor logic 
flow could dramatically increase the time it took to understand spreadsheets. 
 
• Short Arcs of Precedence. Raffensperger (2003) has given a number of suggestions to 
improve spreadsheet readability. One is to use short arcs of precedence between each 
formula and the cells that precede it. This requires formatting to be simple so that there is 
not too much vertical white space. Keeping arcs of precedence also is consistent with 
spreadsheet error research. Lerch [ 1988] found that people often make errors when 
entering formulas that refer to distant cells. Janvrin and Morrison [1996, 2000], in turn, 
found that the error rate was extremely high when links had to be made to data or formulas 
in other worksheets in a spreadsheet workbook. 
 
• Panko [1988] suggested two basic principles for entering formulas. One was to avoid 
jamming, in which a cell formula contains multiple numbers. For instance, if a company 
sells SOO units of a product at $400, the developer might enter a cell with the content 
"=500*400. This is jamming. It is better to have one cell labeled units and containing the 
number 500 and a second cell labeled price with the value $400. The revenue cell, then, 
would refer to the other two cells. In short, there should be a single number in a cell or no 
Sarbanes-Oxley: What About All the Spreadsheets? 
Raymond R.. Panko & Nicholas Ordway 
 
 27
numbers at all. Teo and Tan [ 1997] confirmed that jamming leads to increased errors 
during subsequent what-if analysis. With jamming, it is difficult to know which cells to 
change because individual numbers do not have text labels to identify them. Avoiding 
jamming also improves readability because readers can understand the labeled numbers 
more easily. For this same reason, avoiding jamming also makes testing easier. Jamming 
does have one advantage: it shortens arcs of precedence. However, this is a small benefit 
compared to jamming's loss of readability. 
 
• Panko [ 1988] also suggested that numbers should not be entered more than once. For 
instance, if units sold is used in both revenue and cost calculations, the number of units 
sold should be entered into a cell only once and then referred to in revenue and cost fonnula 
cells. Lukasic [ 1998] examined two large spreadsheets and found that the same number 
was often entered multiple times and that the number was not always changed consistently in 
what-if analyses. 
 
• Repeat numbers across multiple columns through referencing. Teo and Tan [ 1997] did find 
one situation in which repetition is valuable. In a time-period-based spreadsheet, when 
students entered numbers like tax rates in all columns of a spreadsheet, they made fewer 
errors during what-if analysis than if only a single cell had the tax rate. This makes sense 
because Lerch [1988] found that when people entered references to cells in different rows 
and columns they made many more mistakes than they did when referencing cells in the 
same row or the same column as the formula cell. Even so, the actual number should only 
be typed once and then referenced in other cells in the row that contains it. 
 
 
Appropriate Documentation 
 
Almost all spreadsheets have known limitations. There appears to be a need to have a 
documentation worksheet that gives readers the context of the spreadsheet's development. For 
instance, the documentation should warn that certain information had to be estimated because 
time pressures prevented the collection of data. In addition, if input values only have limited ranges 
over which the spreadsheet has been tested, this should be noted as well. 
 
 
Controversies 
 
• The controls just noted all have a foundation in research findings. Several other 
prescriptions are often given. Unfortunately, they either have no research basis or appear 
to run counter to research findings. 
 
• Use an Input/Processing/Output Design? A very common prescription is for each 
module to have an input section containing data, a processing section showing 
intermediate formulas, and an output section containing the results. There is no research 
supporting this approach at all. In addition, this approach creates extremely long arcs of 
precedence, which are very likely to lead to pointing errors when entering formulas. 
This approach is also likely to harm readability. To understand calculations, the reader 
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would have to switch constantly between the three sections. Note that most tax 
preparation programs for individuals show calculations with the data the calculations 
use. This provides high readability. 
 
• Use Long Formulas? Although Raffensperger [2003] has made many valuable 
suggestions for improving readability, one of his suggestions appears to run counter to 
research. This is his suggestion to use complex formulas rather than a series of several 
simpler formulas. As noted earlier, proofreading research shows that people's error 
detection rate for spelling errors falls rapidly with word size. Panko [ 1999] found that 
this was also true for spreadsheet formulas. 
 
• Clarity Rather than "Efficiency." It is important to make logic flows as clear as possible, 
even if there is a shorter way to express logic. Given the speed of today's computer, 
there is no excuse for "tricky coding." Readability of logic flows is paramount in 
avoiding errors during development as well as in enhancing testing. 
 
• Use Range Names? Another common suggestion is that developers should use range 
names in their formulas. Although this appears to be attractive, it raises a serious 
concern. In selecting ranges for range names, pointing errors can assign the wrong range 
to a range name. Although the range will be wrong, but it will appear to be correct in 
formulas that merely reference the range names. Although the research findings are not 
clear on this issue, using range names should be considered potentially dangerous until 
research on using range names is done. 
 
• Appropriate Code Documentation. Almost everyone suggests that documentation is 
important, but it is rarely done in practice because the task is so onerous. One potential 
option is use code documentation only where the flow of logic is likely to be 
non-obvious. This could be done with comments inserted into formula cells. This 
approach might reduce code documentation sufficiently to increase its use. Research has 
not been done in this area. 
 
• Risk Analysis. A number of prescriptions now call for risk analysis, in which the 
likelihood of errors and their likely impacts are assessed. Riskier spreadsheets should 
have more controls. Although the need for risk analysis is obvious, most methodologies 
have poor approaches to assessing the likelihood of errors. 
 
• Spreadsheet error research uniformly indicates that the main factor leading to the 
likelihood of error is the length of the spreadsheet in terms of calculation chains. 
Methods tend to focus too much on formula complexity and other factors that are likely 
to be secondary. It seems mandatory to assume a 2% cell error rate in any risk analysis 
and to assume, consistent with software research, that 10% to 20% of all errors will be 
serious. 
 
Controlling for Fraud 
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Traditionally, spreadsheet error researchers have focused on "honest error," that is, the 
assumption that incorrect spreadsheets result from honest mistakes. However, people who 
commit fraud may use spreadsheets to execute their frauds. Controlling for fraud in spreadsheet 
development requires new approaches to controlling spreadsheet usage in the firm. Given the 
importance of Sarbanes-Oxley, controlling for fraud involving spreadsheets has become a serious 
concern. 
 
Fraud 
 
We discussed fraud informally earlier. Legally, a fraud exists when one person knowingly 
lies or conceals information whose nondisclosure would make other statements misleading, in 
order to get the victim to act in a way contrary to the victim's interests. Note that two elements 
are needed for there to be fraud: deception and harm. As noted earlier, when people develop 
spreadsheets, there often is bias that does not rise to the level of fraud. However, when the impact 
becomes large, then fraud occurs. 
 
The Fraud Triangle 
 
As noted earlier, the Auditing Standards Board's SAS 99 requires auditors to be extremely 
vigilant about fraud. Compared to SAS 82, which the new standard replaced, SAS 99 provides 
much more guidance on the detection of fraud, and SAS 99 requires many more mandatory 
actions to seek out fraud. SAS 99 requires significant changes in mandatory auditing procedures 
and documentation in a financial statement audits. 
 
The standard requires a mindset that constantly asks questions with a critical mind in order 
to identify risks and actual fraud. The standard requires the auditor to look for political promises 
that will be difficult to meet legitimately, budget pressures, general management style, the 
effectiveness of the firm's audit committee, the vigilance of the board of directors, and many 
other things. 
 
One contribution of SAS 99 is the fraud triangle, which is shown as Figure 8. The fraud 
triangle emphasizes that auditors need to look for three indications of fraud risk. 
 
Figure 8: The Fraud Triangle 
 
• Incentive. Auditors must constantly ask why employees would be attracted to fraud in 
particular circumstance. An obvious motive is the misappropriation of assets, but other 
motivations are very common. For instance, in many cases, the goal of the fraud is to cover 
poor performance (as was the case at Allfirst) or to make a firm look like it is doing better 
than it actually is to attract more capital. 
 
• Opportunity. Even if incentives are strong, if there is little opportunity to succeed, then the 
existence of strong controls will deter most fraud. Conversely, if controls are weak, this 
will offer a strong attraction to employees with potentially criminal motives. 
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• Rationalization. Law enforcement officials have long known that it is important to 
understand how criminals justify their behavior to themselves. For instance, when the fraud 
is done to cover up poor performance, the perpetrator is likely to believe that they will 
"make things good" in the future. In other cases, there is a rationalization that "everybody 
does it," or "the company owes it to me." A strong control environment with intensive 
ethics training can help reduce rationalizations. It is very important for auditors to 
understand these motivations and opportunities so that they can accurately assess the 
potential for fraud in given situations. 
 
Fraud Controls 
 
Fraud controls are ways to reduce the frequency, severity, or difficulty of detecting frauds. 
In general, there are four general categories of controls: management controls, operational 
controls, technological controls, and data controls. 
 
Managerial Controls 
 
Management controls generally involve the setting and oversight of broad policies, rather 
than day-to-day actions. 
 
• Top Management Support. At Allfirst and AIB, top management was largely divorced from 
control issues, leaving them to back-office groups. There was even confusion over whether 
various control measures should be handled by AlB or Allfirst. 
 
• Risk Assessment. Top management must conduct risk assessments to identify areas of high 
risk. Certainly, trading large options is highly risky if not properly controlled. In addition, it 
requires specialized knowledge, and allowing an inexperienced trader to do it in a company 
like Allfirst, where it was outside of the firm's main line of business, was obviously a 
high-risk situation that needed extensive control. 
 
• Policy Development. A company needs to establish policies for activities involving high 
risks. Policies give strong direction to lower-level employees, and they ensure (if followed) 
that all activities will be treated equally. 
 
• Policy Follow-Up. Creating policies good, but if they are not followed, then they mean 
nothing. Management must check that its policies are being followed through some sort of 
auditing function. 
 
• Establishing Independent Audits and Reports. Sarbanes-Oxley requires firms to create audit 
committees that are independent of the company's senior management. They also require 
that companies set up a "whistle blower's" hotline for any employee to contact the 
independent audit committee. This committee's and hot line's scope should extend beyond 
financial reporting. 
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• Enforcing Sanctions. When employees violate policies, the firm needs to implement 
sanctions. Otherwise, employees have only limited incentives to follow corporate policies. 
 
Operational Controls 
 
• Good Development Practice. There should be controls on application development for all 
spreadsheets. This should include initial risk assessment, development methods and 
practices, and testing. 
 
• Cell Protection. One development practice is particularly important. This is creating cell 
protection to prevent users from overwriting formula cells. This is always a concern for 
innocent error, and it is even more of a concern for fraud. 
 
• Operational Audits. Creating policies is good, but if they are not followed, then they mean 
nothing. Management must check that its policies are being followed through an active 
auditing function. 
 
• Separation of Duties. There should be clear separation of duties so that at least collusion 
will be necessary for fraud to succeed. For instance, it may make sense to separate the 
functions of spreadsheet developer and spreadsheet user. 
 
• Controlling Developer Access. In programming, it is common to have development be 
done on a single machine to which the developer has access. After development, the 
program should be moved to a testing machine. On the testing machine, testers should have 
access, but the developer does not. Finally, the program is moved to a production machine 
on which neither the developer nor testers have access. 
 
• Requiring Testing. There should be required procedures for testing that specify all of the 
aspects of testing described earlier. 
 
• Training in Paranoid Testing. Code inspection normally looks for innocent errors. 
Companies need to develop practices to identify fraudulent deception, including attempts to 
hide these subterfuges. 
 
• General Employee Training. It is important to train all employees to be wise consumers of 
spreadsheet results. This includes creating healthy skepticism about the trustworthiness of 
spreadsheets in terms of both errors and deception. 
 
Technological Controls 
 
When firms look at spreadsheets, they usually are dismayed by the poor fraud controls built 
into spreadsheet programs. This is an area that badly needs to be developed by Microsoft and 
other vendors. The following is a list of possible technological controls that need to be 
considered. 
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• Change Auditing. With spreadsheets today, it is difficult or impossible to know who made 
changes to the spreadsheet, what they did, and what the spreadsheet said before. Change 
auditing needs to be added to spreadsheet programs if fraud is to be controllable. 
 
• Usage Auditing. Similarly, when a spreadsheet is used, multiple people may enter data. For 
the separation of responsibilities during data entry, the spreadsheet program should be able 
to record who enters which values. 
 
• Authentication. Auditing requires strong authentication. Passwords have proven to be 
relatively easy to guess or steal. For high-risk spreadsheets, stronger authentication 
methods should be offered by spreadsheet programs. 
• Compilation Tools. One useful feature in spreadsheets would be the ability to compile 
spreadsheets. Users would only be able to enter data and would not be able to change the 
logic. Although cell protection should be able to do this, it is too easy to circumvent. 
 
• Audit Detection Tools. In security, when certain audit events occur, intrusion detection 
systems send warnings to security administrators. Spreadsheet programs need to develop 
the ability for certain events to be audited during spreadsheet development and use and for 
warnings to be sent to security administrators when certain events occur. 
 
Data Controls 
 
Data controls focus on how data is handled. Sources should be controlled, each input item 
should be checked for reasonableness (length, range of valid values, etc.), data input operators 
should be trained, and so forth. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although Sarbanes-Oxley has focused attention on spreadsheets in financial reporting, once 
organizations begin to take a hard look at their spreadsheets, they will almost certainly realize 
that all large and important spreadsheets need careful control. 
 
We know the most about innocent spreadsheet errors. We know that people make errors in 
approximately 2% of all unique formula cells even with careful development. We know, as a 
consequence, that all large spreadsheets will contain many errors after careful development. We 
know that testing is needed to reduce this error rate to a reasonable level, and we generally know 
how to test spreadsheets and how to develop them so that they are testable. 
 
However, financial reporting is also concerned with fraud. Unfortunately, spreadsheet 
programs today offer few useful features for dealing with fraud. Financial reporting systems that 
use spreadsheet programs almost invariably have many manual operations, and spreadsheet 
programs offer no tools for event auditing. Until spreadsheet programs develop features to 
address fraud reduction concerns, organizations will have to cope by developing strong 
management and operational controls. 
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